Discrete-choice modelling of patient preferences for modes of drug administration. by Tetteh, EK et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Discrete-choice modelling of patient
preferences for modes of drug
administration
Ebenezer Kwabena Tetteh*, Steve Morris and Nigel Titcheneker-Hooker
Abstract
The administration of (biologically-derived) drugs for various disease conditions involves consumption of resources
that constitutes a direct monetary cost to healthcare payers and providers. An often ignored cost relates to a
mismatch between patients’ preferences and the mode of drug administration. The “intangible” benefits of giving
patients what they want in terms of the mode of drug delivery is seldom considered. This study aims to evaluate,
in monetary terms, end-user preferences for the non-monetary attributes of different modes of drug administration
using a discrete-choice experiment. It provides empirical support to the notion that there are significant benefits
from developing patient-friendly approaches to drug delivery. The gross benefits per patient per unit administration
is in the same order of magnitude as the savings in resource costs of administering drugs. The study argues that, as
long as the underlying manufacturing science is capable, a patient-centred approach to producing drug delivery
systems should be encouraged and pursued.
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Introduction
A recent systematic review [1] notes that administration
of multiple drug doses over time requires different types
of medical resources and hence can have a non-trivial
impact on the monetary costs of healthcare delivery.
This argument, however, does not consider the non-
monetary hedonic characteristics (attributes) of adminis-
tering drugs that are linked to the preferences of patients
for different modes of drug administration. That is to
say, a full accounting of the societal costs and benefits of
resources expended on drug administration should take
into account both the direct monetary and indirect non-
monetary costs and benefits. This is because a given
mode of drug administration that incurs the lowest
monetary cost to healthcare payers or providers may
incur hidden indirect costs in terms of a mismatch with
what is preferred by end-users, be it patients or other-
wise healthy people [2].
It is crucial therefore to understand and assess the
characteristics (attributes) of drug administration – such
that better drugs can be developed and manufactured
tailored to patients’ preferences. The importance of this
is evident from a report published by the Knowledge
Transfer Network (HealthTech and Medicines) on “[t]he
future of high value manufacturing [in the pharmaceut-
ical, biopharmaceutical and medical device sectors] in
the UK” [3]. The report identified, among a number of
factors, the importance of: (1) early consideration of
manufacturing needs, (2) flexible production facilities;
(3) reducing cost to the UK National Health Services
[NHS] and (4) the delivery of better services and im-
proved health outcomes to patients. The last, in particu-
lar, focussed on the need for more stable, effective
medicines; novel ways of administering them; and smart
[packaging] technologies to monitor usage by patients. A
full understanding of end-user preferences for modes of
drug administration is necessary if objective (4) above is
to be achieved.
In this study, we aim to evaluate the attributes of drug
administration, focusing on the preferences of patients,
or otherwise healthy people from the UK general public.
We do this using a discrete choice experiments (DCE)
that – in contrast to interviews, focus groups and other
in-person surveys – supports quantitative estimation of* Correspondence: e.tetteh@ucl.ac.uk; kwabetteh@yahoo.com
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the strength of end-user preferences for different attributes
and how they are traded off against one another. In
addition, a DCE supports monetary valuation of different
attribute combinations that produce estimates of the
indirect benefits to end-users. By monetizing preferences, a
comparison with the direct monetary costs of adminis-
tering biologic drugs can be made. The direct monetary
costs of administration can be predicted using the algo-
rithm developed by Tetteh and Morris [4]. And we will
argue that these predicted cost estimates plus preference
valuations measured in this paper should be considered in
(bio)manufacturing decision-making. This is the kind of
information manufacturers need in order to make patient-
friendly drugs that have low administration costs. The use
of such evidence in pre-market R&D and manufacturing
decisions should yield drug products with added value.
Cost-effectiveness assessments, from a healthcare
payer perspective, will capture the added value in terms
of savings in drug administration costs. This is not the
case for indirect end-user benefits. The comfort of an
improved mode of drug administration is seldom consid-
ered in evidence-based medicine and often seen as “lux-
ury”. The DCE conducted in this study however shows
the monetary value of intangible end-user benefits (what
some may consider luxury that can be ignored) is signifi-
cant. This finding is most relevant to (bio)pharmaceut-
ical manufacturers as they are the translators of
promising (biologic) drug candidates into medicines that
offer positive direct health benefits relative to placebo or
existing treatments. The pertinent issue here is whether
healthcare payers recognize and are willing to pay for
the indirect benefits to end-users, besides the direct
health benefits. If they do, manufacturers will be faced
with the right incentives to produce drugs that make
significant contribution to patient care.
Background
Our starting point was the observation that drug adminis-
tration is one part of the whole packaged good or service
we call health or medical care. Preferences for different
modes of drug administration reflect a derived demand
for the direct health benefits offered by a given drug
product. The mode of drug administration simply consti-
tutes a vehicle via which these direct health benefits are
delivered to a patient. The willingness to pay for a mar-
keted drug product will include valuations of the direct
health benefits it offers plus valuations of the means by
which these direct health benefits are delivered. A DCE in
which drug products are identical in every aspect except
their mode of administration, provides the means of
evaluating the attributes of drug administration separately.
The attributes and attribute-levels chosen in such a DCE
should be realistic and relevant to manufacturing
decisions and/or consumer (end-user) choices.
Under the premise of utility-maximizing behaviour, an
end-user (indexed s) will choose a given mode of admin-
istering a drug if the utility derived from that choice is
the maximum among J alternative ways of administering
that same drug. This represents J differentiated product
versions of the same drug. Following Manski [5], the
utility (Usj) from choosing alternative j(=1, 2, …, J) from
among a set of J discrete products has: one, a systematic,
explainable or observable component, Vsj that is a func-
tion of the attributes of drug administration; and two a
random unexplainable error term, ϵsj. We can write the
following:
Usj ¼ Vsj βjkXjk
 
þ sj
βjkXjk ¼ β
0
kX
0
k þ βpCpþ
PJ−1
j¼1ASCj
ð1Þ
where Xjk is a vector of attribute-levels decomposed into
X′k , a vector of generic non-monetary attribute-levels
and Cp, the cost associated with alternative j. βjkis a vec-
tor of preference coefficients, decomposed into β′k , a vec-
tor of coefficients for the non-monetary attributes and
βp, coefficient for the cost attribute. The random error
term (ϵsj) could refer to effects of unobserved attributes;
imperfect information on alternative products available;
measurement error; misspecification of the utility func-
tion; heterogeneity in preferences or simply random be-
haviour [6]. ASCj is an alternative-specific-constant to
capture peculiar effects of each alternative product that
are not reflected in the attributes. (
P
j¼1J−1ASCj may be
considered as the mean of ϵsj.)
Given a sample of end-users (S), a number of choice sets
or situations (N) faced by each end-user and prior knowledge
of the βjkvector, the probability (P) that product j(=1) will be
chosen above the other J – 1 products can be estimated
using the basic multinomial logit (MNL) model [7] as:
P1ns y1 ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ P1ns U1 > Uj
 
¼ exp μ V1ns½ ð ÞPJ
j¼1 exp μ Vjns
  
D sj
 
¼ exp −sj
 
exp − exp μsj
  
; F sj
  ¼ exp − exp μsj  
ð2Þ
where y denotes the choices made such that y1 = 1 if
product j(=1) is selected and zero otherwise. The term μ
is a positive scale parameter that is inversely related to
the error variance (σ2 ) of the panel of choices made.
Equation (2) requires D(ϵsj), a Gumbel (log-Weibull)
probability density function for independent and identi-
cally distributed (IID) error terms, where F(ϵsj) is the
corresponding cumulative density function. Since the
error terms are specific to each choice dataset, μ is
usually normalized to one for the basic MNL model –
indicating homoskedastic (constant) error variance. With
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preference coefficients fixed or invariant over end-users,
and IID error terms, we have the so-called independence
from [ir]relevant alternatives (IIA) assumption – which
suggests the ratio of choice probabilities is independent of
the inclusion or omission of other products.
Methods
Attributes, attribute-levels and experimental designs
In conducting our DCE, we first set out to identify a
common set of relevant attributes and attribute-levels
for different modes of drug administration. We do this
via a selective review of literature investigating different
modes of administering drugs [8–14]. Table 1 below
shows our selected set of attributes, definitions of these
attributes and their levels.
Considering the mode of administration is simply a
vehicle for delivering the direct health benefits offered
by a drug to patients, we opted to specify the alternative
products as drugs that are identical in every aspect apart
from the manner in which they are administered to
patients. We used a forced-choice format of presenting
survey respondents with two unlabelled drugs A and B.
We did not include an “opt-out” alternative as we found
it difficult to imagine that people will choose not to have
a clinically-beneficial drug simply because the way in
which the drug is administered is not what they prefer.
The next step was to develop the experimental designs
that will form the basis of our survey questionnaires.
The designs were created from fractional-factorial de-
signs for estimating only main effects of the attribute-
levels. This was done in SAS v. 9.3, using a set of macros
and programming codes written by Kuhfeld [15, 16], as
follows. We first used the macro “MktRuns” to gain
some insights as to the appropriate number of runs, i.e.,
the sizes of candidate set-designs we could use. The
“MktRuns” macro suggested (among others) the follow-
ing sizes: 48 runs (=24 choice sets), 72 runs (=36 choice
sets) and 144 runs (=72 choice sets). We then used the
macro “MkTex” to create corresponding candidate
set-designs in 48, 72 and 144 runs. Using the macro
“ChoicEff”, we identified and evaluated the statistical ef-
ficiency of the best experimental design containing 24
choice sets and drawn from these candidate set-designs.
We found a 24 choice-set design with a relative D-
efficiency of 65%. This was developed from the candi-
date set-design with 48 runs.
To test the integrity of the experimental designs
above (since we had no prior information on the
attribute coefficients), we merged them with simu-
lated pre-pilot discrete-choice data using the macro
“MktMerge”. Given the artificial dataset created, we
estimated a basic MNL model using the macro
“phChoice” and SAS PHREG procedure. Compared
with the other competing 24 choice-set designs
developed from candidate set-designs with 72 and 144
runs, the design developed from the candidate with
48 runs, produced the lowest estimates of standard
errors over all attribute-coefficients for the same sim-
ulated choice data. It also had the highest number of
Table 1 Attributes, definitions and attribute-levels
Attributes Definitions Levels
Method of
drug
administration
This attribute refers to the route by
which therapeutically-active drug
products are physically adminis-
tered into a patient. The attribute-
levels include all other “needle-free”
methods of drug administration to
capture the preferences of patients
who desire oral drug delivery and/
or have a fear of needles.
1. Intravenous
delivery
2. Subcutaneous
delivery
3. Intramuscular
delivery
4. Needle-free
delivery
Dosing
frequency
This attribute refers to the
frequency of administering a drug
for a single full course of treatment.
Dosing frequency associated with
repeated treatments should not be
considered.
1. Once every six
months
2. Once every
month
3. Once every
week
4. Once every
day
Setting This attribute refers to place
(clinical and non-clinical settings)
where a given drug is adminis-
tered. Clinical settings include, for
example, hospitals, outpatient
clinics, care homes, offices of gen-
eral practitioners/physicians etc.
Non-clinical settings include home,
schools and other public places.
1. Clinical
2. Non-clinical +
self-
administration*
3. Non-clinical +
supervision*
Disruption to
daily activities
This attribute refers to how a given
method of drug administration or
dosing frequency disrupts the daily
activities of patients. Disruptions
could be due to, for example,
repeated venepuncture and, in the
extreme, immobility (hospitalization
for the sole purpose of drug
administration).
1. None
2. Moderate but
manageable
3. Moderate but I
can’t cope
4. Severe
Risk of adverse
events
This attribute refers to features of
drug administration that might
cause discomfort or injury to
patients or health-staff administer-
ing drugs. This could be local or
generalized adverse events such as
indurations; damage to nerves and
blood vessels; abscess formation
around the sites of injection etc.
This is separate from side-effects of
the drug molecule itself.
1. None
2. Moderate
3. Severe
Cost This attribute refers to the
additional time and travel costs
borne out-of-pocket by the patient
each time they have to take or
their medicines or it has to be
given to them by health workers.
1. £0
2. £10
3. £50
4. £100
Notes: * This refers to the situation where people, if properly trained, could
self-administer the drug in a non-clinical setting; or otherwise, their medica-
tions will have to be delivered to them under the supervision of qualified
healthcare professional, for example, a community or district nurse. Given this
set of attributes and attribute-levels, we have a full factorial of 2304 (= 4432)
possible profiles or treatment combinations
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statistically significant attribute-coefficients.1 We
therefore chose this design for our survey
questionnaire.
However, there is a trade-off here: an experimental de-
sign with the highest possible D-efficiency may impose
greater cognitive burden (task complexity) on survey re-
spondents. One has to balance a desire for near-optimal
designs with the possibility of collecting irrational or in-
consistent choices [17]. We therefore, using the macro
“MktBlock”, partitioned our chosen experimental design
into two versions – such that each block version con-
tained a sequence of 12 randomly allocated choice tasks.
Survey administration
From the blocked experimental designs above, we devel-
oped two draft versions of the survey questionnaire.
Each questionnaire was split into three sections. The
first section provided a preamble with information about
the purpose of the study and the hypothetical con-
structed context in which respondents had to make their
choices. It also provided descriptions of the attributes
and attribute-levels as well as an example of a completed
choice set as a guide for the survey respondents (see
Fig. 1 below). The second section contained the actual
sequence of 12 choice questions or situations; and
the third section collected anonymized information on
individual respondents’ characteristics. We did not col-
lect any data on respondents’ stated non-attendance to
the attributes as this was not an objective of this study.
The anonymized format of the questionnaires meant we
did not require ethical approval prior to administering
the survey.
Before sending the questionnaires out, we carried out
a small-scale informal pilot of the draft versions of the
questionnaires with no more than five people from the
UK general public (given the time and resources avail-
able for this study). We asked recipients of the question-
naires to check the wording of the questionnaire; to
ensure that the instructions were clear and to identify
what might be perceived as implausible combination of
attributes and attribute-levels. The respondents found all
combinations of attributes and attribute-levels plausible,
although some combinations may not be technologically
feasible (given the current state of manufacturing or
formulation science). We found that it took, on average,
15–20 min to complete each block version of the
questionnaire. Following the pilot phase, we made small
wording changes to the questionnaire to improve clarity.
We determined that a minimum sample size of 200
survey respondents will be adequate for meaning
analyses. This was not derived from statistical sampling
theory requiring accurate prior estimates of preference
Fig. 1 Example choice set
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coefficients or choice probabilities/proportions. It is a
pragmatic choice determined by the research budget and
it is consistent with the range of sample sizes reported
in Bridges et al. [17]. With the help of a commercial
vendor (Survey Monkey), the questionnaires were ad-
ministered online to a sample of people from the UK
general population. It took roughly 2 weeks for the
vendor to complete the web-based surveys.
Econometric modelling
To explore plausible explanations (unobserved hetero-
geneity, variation in preferences, respondent fatigue etc.)
for the observed sequence of choices in the data col-
lected, we estimated a number of econometric models.
As our starting point, we estimated a basic MNL model.
The IID/IIA assumption underlying this model (with
normalization of the scale parameter to one), however, is
equivalent to saying that all survey respondents have the
same preferences and/or that unobserved variation
around these preferences are similar. For this reason,
some researchers will argue that all estimates derived
from the basic MNL model are biased. We therefore
considered alternative econometric models that relax the
IID/IIA restriction.
We considered a heteroskedastic multinomial
(HMNL) model, where the scale parameter is no longer
normalized to one but considered a variable that must
be estimated. The error terms are therefore no longer
IID distributed, and a typical approach is to express the
scale parameter as a function of a vector of respondents’
characteristics (Z). The probability of an individual
choosing alternative product j from among a set of
competing products, in a given choice situation, is
then given by:
Pjns yj ¼ 1
 
¼
exp exp αZsð ÞβjkXjk
 
PJ
j¼1 exp exp αZsð ÞβjkXjk
  ð3Þ
where α is a vector of coefficients reflecting the influ-
ence of respondents’ characteristics on the error vari-
ance. If α̂ is not statistically different from zero, we
revert back to or close to the basic MNL model. If α̂ is
statistically significant different from zero, then it is pos-
sible to exogenously determine subpopulations with
somewhat identical preferences [18].
A variant of the HMNL model is the entropy multi-
nomial (EMNL) model in which the scale parameter is a
function of entropy (E): a measure of the information
content or uncertainty represented in the probability dis-
tribution of a discrete random variable, in this case the
choice variable y. In DCE literature, entropy summarizes
the impact of task complexity or respondent fatigue due
to the number of choice alternatives; the number and
correlation between attributes and attribute-levels; and
similarity between the alternatives. The relationship be-
tween the scale parameter and entropy of each choice
situation can be expressed as:
μns ¼ exp θ1Ens þ θ2E2ns
 
Ens ¼ −
PJ
j¼1dPjns log dPjns 
ð4Þ
where dPjns is the estimated choice probability from the
basic MNL model; θ1 , θ2 are parameters associated with
entropy. The linear term cθ1 measures deviation from
maximum entropy, i.e., completely random choices
whilst the quadratic term cθ2 identifies non-linearity in
the relationship above. The case of cθ1 > 0 indicates en-
tropy is either offset by exertion of more effort and/or
(independent of effort) respondents’ under-estimation of
the differences between choice alternatives. Researchers
often treat the case of cθ1 < 0 and cθ2 > 0 as indicative of
respondent fatigue (declining effort) as a survey re-
spondent works through a sequence of choice sets
[19, 20].
Next we considered the mixed multinomial (MMNL)
model in which β varies randomly across individual re-
spondents. Typically, these random coefficients are
drawn from a mixture of continuous parametric distri-
butions denoted by f(β∣δ), where δ refers to parameters
of that mixture distribution. The choice probability
for alternative product j (out of all J products) is then
given by:
Pjns yj ¼ 1
 
¼
Z
βsjk
exp βsjkXjk
 
PJ
j¼1 exp βsjkXjk
 
24 35:f βjδð Þ∂βsjk
ð5Þ
where the values of βsjk are drawn from the continuous
mixture distribution f(β∣δ) [21]. Here we assumed the
individual-specific non-price preference coefficients that
had no statistically significant effects in the basic MNL
model are normally distributed and correlated with a
price coefficient that is log-normal distributed and con-
strained to be negative. This combination of random
attribute-coefficients and extreme-value (Gumbel) dis-
tributed error terms, however, means the MMNL model
cannot be solved analytically but approximated via simu-
lations with a finite number of draws.
Finally, we considered a latent-class multinomial
(LCMNL) model that assumes attribute-coefficients are
drawn from a mixture of non-parametric discrete distri-
butions, representing C latent classes of homogenous
subpopulations. It is not known a priori which latent
class an individual belongs to; and the probability of
latent-class membership (π) can be estimated as:
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πcs γð Þ ¼
exp νc þ γcZs
 
1þPC−1c¼1 exp νc þ γcZs  ð6Þ
where
PC
c¼1πc ¼ 1 , the vector γ (=γ1, γ2, … , γC) refers
to the effect of individuals’ characteristics on class mem-
bership, and νc is a vector of class-specific constants
[22]. Unconditional on class membership, the probability
(P*) of observing the sequence of N choices that an indi-
vidual respondent makes is given by:
P yNs ¼ 1
  ¼XC
c¼1 πcs
YN
n¼1
YJ
j¼1
exp βcjkXjk
 
P
j¼1
J exp βcjkXjk
 
0@ 1Ays
ð7Þ
where the optimal number of latent classes C* is
determined by: (1) estimating a series of LCMNL models
with different numbers of latent classes; (2) choosing the
preferred model using the lowest consistent Akaike
Table 2 Explanatory variables
Variables Definitions (Effects coding)
INTRAVENOUS =1 if a drug is administered
intravenously (1, 0, 0, −1)
SUBCUTANEOUS =1 if a drug is administered
subcutaneously (0, 1, 0, −1)
INTRAMUSCULAR =1 if a drug is administered
ntramuscularly (0, 0, 1, −1).
The reference category
(−1) is administration via
needle-free routes
DOSFREQ Continuous variable referring
to the number of unit
administrations over a one
year period for a single full
course of treatment
NONCLINICAL_SELF =1 if a drug is self-administered
in non-clinical settings (1, 0, −1)
NONCLINICAL_SUPV =1 if a drug is administered
in non-clinical settings under
the supervision of a qualified
healthcare professional (0, 1, −1).
The reference category (−1) is
drug administration in clinical settings
DDA_MODERATE1 =1 if a given mode of administration
is associated with moderate but
manageable disruption to respondents’
daily activities (1, 0, 0, −1)
DDA_MODERATE2 =1 if a given mode of drug
administration is associated with
moderate disruptions to daily
activities that a respondent cannot
cope with (0, 1, 0, −1)
DDA_SEVERE =1 if a given mode of drug
administration is associated with
severe disruption to the respondent’s
daily activities (0, 0, 1, −1). The
reference category (−1) is a mode
of administration that carries no risk
of disruption to patients’
daily activities
RAE_MODERATE =1 if the risk of adverse events
associated with a given
mode of drug administration
s moderate (1, 0, −1)
RAE_SEVERE =1 if the risk of adverse events
associated with a given mode
of drug administration is severe
(0, 1, −1). The reference category
(−1) is drug delivery that is
associated with no risk of
adverse events
COST Continuous variable indicating
the time and travel costs
borne by patients per unit
administration
A Alternative-specific constant = 1
for drug option A (1, −1).
The reference point,
drug option B = −1
FEMALE =1 if survey respondent is
female (1, −1). The reference
category (−1) are males
Table 2 Explanatory variables (Continued)
RESPONDENTAGE Continuous variable indicating
the age of a survey respondent
VOCATIONAL =1 if the highest level of education
attained by a respondent is
vocational training (1, 0, −1)
GCSEs_O + A =1 if the highest level of
education attained by a
respondent is GCSEs O′ and A’
levels (0, 1, −1). The reference
category (−1) are respondents
with “higher education”
EMPLOYED =1 if respondent is employed
(1, −1). The reference category
(−1) are those who are
currently unemployed
INCOME_1 =1 if respondent’s annual
household income is under
£15,000 (1, 0, 0, 0, −1)
INCOME_2 =1 if respondent’s annual
household income is between
£15,000 and £29,999 (0, 1, 0, 0, −1)
INCOME_3 =1 if respondent’s annual
household income is between
£30,000 and £49,999 (0, 0, 1, 0, −1)
INCOME_4 =1 if respondent’s annual
household income is between
£50,000 and £75,000 (0, 0, 0, 1, −1).
The reference category (−1)
are respondents
with annual household income
in excess of £75,000
PRIOR_ ILLNESS =1 if a survey respondent had
received medical treatment
under the advice or guidance of
a qualified health worker over
the past year (1, −1). The
reference category (−1) are those who
remained healthy over the past year
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Information Criterion [cAIC] and/or Bayes Information
Criterion [BIC]; and (3) making judgements on the
trade-off between improved log-likelihoods and increase
in standard errors (loss in precision) of the attribute-
coefficients as the number of latent-classes gets large.
We estimated the models in STATA v. 11 using the
attribute-based (X) and respondent-characteristics (Z)
variables in Table 2 below. The Z variables are those in
the shaded region of Table 2. The values of our explana-
tory variables are effects coded rather than 0–1 dummies
to ensure the alternative-specific constant and other
constant terms carry no information about the reference
or omitted categories. See Bech and Gyrd-Hansen [23].
Measuring patient benefits
The outputs of the models above allow us to compute,
first, the marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for a
given change in an attribute (level) or a bundle of attri-
butes. MWTP is the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween the non-monetary attributes (singly or in a
bundle) and the price/cost attribute – assuming there is
only one product available that will be chosen with a
100% certainty. For our purposes, we only computeddMWTP for a single non-monetary attribute (= − bβk= bβp ).
Classical confidence intervals were generated using 100
bootstrap replicates of dMWTP . Admittedly, a higher
number of replicates is needed for more precise estima-
tion but we prefer this procedure as it is: (1) computa-
tionally less demanding; (2) uses actual data from
respondents without making parametric assumptions
about the distribution of dMWTP [24]; and (3) compat-
ible with all STATA estimators for the HMNL, EMNL,
MMNL and LCMNL models.
Second, we estimated the incremental welfare gain or
loss from switching (changing) from one product to an-
other using the expected compensating variation (ECV).
This is a more valid measure of welfare benefits when
there is uncertainty about which product will be chosen.
For discrete-choice probabilities estimated using an
MNL-type model, ECV is formally computed as follows:
ECV ¼ −1λ ln
XJ
j¼1
exp cV0j − lnXJ
j¼1
exp cV1j 
" #
ð8Þ
where λ is the marginal utility of income proxied by the
negative coefficient of the price/cost attribute; and the
superscripts 0 and 1 denote the conditions before and after
the change (switch). The log-sum expressions or “inclusive
values” in the brackets effectively weight the systematic
utilities by the probability that an alternative product will be
chosen in each state. Analogous to a change in consumer
surplus, ECV measures the amount of money that will have
to be extracted from an individual for them to remain
indifferent between the initial (0) and final (1) states [25–27].
The ECV estimates computed in this study thus provides
a monetary value of what might be considered intangible
benefits of giving patients what they want in terms of the
mode of drug delivery. From previous work [4], however,
we know there are potential administration-cost savings to
healthcare payers and providers from reformulating or
reverse-engineering a drug product. To ascertain whether
these intangible benefits are of any significant importance,
we compared our ECV estimates with predicted adminis-
tration cost savings of switching from one mode of drug
delivery to another.
Results
Descriptive statistics
On completion of the DCE survey, we checked the data
collected for incomplete sequence(s) of choices so as to
avoid estimation biases due to discontinuous preferences
(“noise”) created by information overload, boredom, un-
familiarity with or lack of interest in the survey. We found
that each survey respondent completed all 12 choice tasks.
Our estimation sample thus provided 10,608 usable choice
responses from 442 respondents. We had no information
on the number of people the vendor approached in order
to achieve the minimum number of respondents. It is not
possible therefore to compute response rates for the survey
although the choice data was collected from more than the
minimum number of respondents specified. Table 3 pro-
vides a summary of the sample demographic characteristics.
We make no argument that this sample is representative of
the UK population.
Factors influencing choices
Table 4 shows the results from our econometric modelling.
Given that we employed a forced-choice format for our
survey with only two alternatives, we could not perform a
Hausman-McFadden [28] statistical test for the IID/IIA
assumption underlying the basic MNL model. However,
the different results obtained from HMNL, EMNL,
MMNL and LCMNL models suggest that the IID/IIA
assumption would have been violated. The HMNL and
EMNL models indicate non-constant error terms, whilst
the MMNL and LCMNL models indicate variation in
observed preferences across the survey respondents. Based
on the log-likelihoods and Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC), the LCMNL model with two latent classes2 offers
the best model fit to our data. That is to say, preference
variation in our dataset can be conveniently represented by
two homogenous subgroups of respondents.
That said, the other models provide useful insights on
the choice behaviour of respondents. For example, a La-
grangian Multiplier test for heteroskedastic errors in the
HMNL model showed statistically significant unobserved
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variation that is explained by gender, age, education and
employment status. Other respondents’ characteristics:
prior illness within the past year and household-income
were only statistically significant contributors to unob-
served heterogeneity at the 10% level. (Note that Table 4
only reports selected findings on the set of contributors to
unobserved heterogeneity in the HMNL model.) Similarly,
a Lagrangian Multiplier test for heteroskedastic errors in
the EMNL model showed statistically significant unob-
served variation.3 However, the statistically insignificant en-
tropy parameters (cθ1 ; bθ2 ) of the EMNL model, withcθ1 > 0
, suggested that respondent fatigue (perhaps offset by learn-
ing effects) could be ignored as plausible explanations for
the sequence of choices observed. We believe this justifies
our decision to block the experimental designs underlying
the survey questionnaires. That aside, the improvement in
log-likelihoods observed with the MMNL model, over and
above that of the MNL model, confirm there are some sig-
nificant variations in and correlations between the coeffi-
cients drawn from the continuous mixture distribution.
This heterogeneity and correlations in preferences, how-
ever, can be captured equivalently by the LCMNL model.
Focusing on the results of the LCMNL model, we
observed the probability that any individual belongs
to the first subgroup (latent-class 1) is determined by
age, gender, and education; and not household income
or prior illness suffered in the previous year. Condi-
tional on membership of latent-class 1, the average or
representative survey respondent is indifferent to
needle-free modes of drug administration when com-
pared with intravenous or subcutaneous routes condi-
tional on the other attributes. Respondents are
indifferent in the sense that coefficients for the
INTRAVENOUS and SUBCUTANEOUS variables
were not statistically different from zero. We interpret
this to mean respondents are informed enough to
know that, in some disease states, needle-free routes
may not be the best or a feasible method of drug ad-
ministration. On the other hand, respondents, on
average, show a negative preference for intramuscular
modes of drug delivery when compared with needle-
free routes, perhaps because of the pain involved.
Similarly, we observed a negative preference for drug
administration modes that involve higher dosing fre-
quency albeit the magnitude of the effect was small
and close to zero. We observed also a positive prefer-
ence for self-administration within a non-clinical set-
ting and a negative statistically insignificant
preference for drug administration in non-clinical set-
tings under supervision. A probable explanation for
this result is that if administering a drug requires
supervision by a qualified healthcare professional,
then one might be better off having the drug admin-
istered in a clinical setting.
Our results show a positive preference for “moderate
but manageable” disruptions to daily activities and a
negative preference for “severe” or “moderate but un-
manageable” disruptions to daily activities. This suggests
that respondents did take into account the hypothetical
nature of the choice tasks: although possible (in the fu-
ture), a mode of drug administration that is associated
with zero disruption to daily activities may not be cur-
rently available or technologically feasible. Similarly, we
observed a positive preference for modes of drug admin-
istration associated with a “moderate” risk of adverse
events and a negative preference for modes of drug ad-
ministration associated with “severe” risk of adverse
events. Again, we observed, on average, some kind of
mental accounting of the fact that a mode of drug deliv-
ery that has a zero risk of adverse events may not be
available or technologically feasible.
Conditional on membership of latent-class 2, we ob-
serve similar choice patterns with the following excep-
tions. First, coefficients for the variables for moderate
Table 3 Demographic characteristics of sample
Characteristics (of 442 respondents) N (% of sample)
Gender
Male* 181 (40.95)
Female 261 (59.05)
Respondents’ age
17–34 years 151 (34.16)
35–49 years 155 (35.07)
≥ 50 years 136 (30.77)
Employment status
Employed 307 (69.46)
Unemployed* 135 (30.54)
Household-income category
< £15,000 (per year) 109 (24.66)
£15,000 – £29,999 (per year) 134 (30.32)
£30,000 – £49,999 (per year) 118 (26.70)
£50,000 – £75,000 (per year) 52 (11.76)
> £75,000 (per year)* 29 (6.56)
Highest education achieved
GCSEs O & A levels 189 (42.76)
Higher education* 212 (47.96)
Vocational training 41 (9.28)
Prior illness (in the past year)
Yes 178 (40.27)
No* 264 (59.73)
Notes: N = number of respondents; * indicates the reference category for the
effects coding used (see also Table 2)
Tetteh et al. Health Economics Review  (2017) 7:26 Page 8 of 14
risk of disruptions-to-daily-activities and moderate risk
of adverse events were not statistically significant. That
respondents belonging to latent-class 2 show indiffer-
ence to these attribute-levels provides further support to
our argument that respondents may have, in their deci-
sion choices, considered that drug delivery modes with
zero disruptions to their daily activities and/or zero risk
of adverse events are perhaps unavailable even though
they are desirable. Second, the magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients for the INTRAVENOUS and SUBCUTANEOUS
variables indicate a positive preference for these modes
of drug administration relative to needle-free routes of
administration. But since these effects are not statisti-
cally different from zero, we maintain the argument that
respondents are generally indifferent to the choice
between needle-free and intravenous/subcutaneous
routes of drug administration.
For both latent-classes, we observe a small but sta-
tistically significant coefficient for the cost attribute.
This suggests that our survey respondents have price
inelastic “demands” for the attributes of drug admin-
istration we investigated in response to any (out-of-
pocket) costs of accessing healthcare. This probably
reflects two things. One, the fact that the UK NHS
provides tax-funded insurance protection against the
financial risks of ill health; and two, that the costs in
question are by and large ‘unavoidable’: without
spending resources on some form of a vehicle for ad-
ministering a drug, patients will be unable to realize
the direct health benefits offered by that drug.
Table 4 Econometric results
Dependent variable: CHOICE PROBABILITY
MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model
Variables/Coefficients: β̂ SEð Þ β̂(SE) β̂ SEð Þ βŝ SEð Þ β̂1 SEð Þ β̂2 SEð Þ
INTRAVENOUS −0.011 (0.091) 0.005 (0.057) 0.017 (0.042) −0.026 (0.110) −0.119 (0.439) 0.021 (0.123)
SUBCUTANEOUS 0.021 (0.043) 0.016 (0.027) 0.002 (0.019) −0.016 (0.049) −0.073 (0.130) 0.070 (0.060)
INTRAMUSCULAR −0.136 (0.049)** −0.090 (0.031)** −0.111 (0.037)** −0.123 (0.053)* −0.560 (0.210)** −0.219
(0.064)***
DOSFREQ −0.001 (0.000)*** −0.0005 (0.000)*** −0.001 (0.000)** −0.001 (0.000)*** −0.003 (0.001)*** −0.001 (0.000)**
NONCLINICAL_SELF 0.167 (0.037)*** 0.108 (0.025)*** 0.112 (0.038)** 0.210 (0.039)*** 0.424 (0.128)*** 0.146 (0.045)**
NONCLINICAL_SUPV −0.122 (0.028)*** −0.078 (0.019)*** −0.067 (0.025)** −0.120 (0.030)*** −0.124 (0.093) −0.098 (0.037)**
DDA_MODERATE1 0.391 (0.033)*** 0.239 (0.033)*** 0.214 (0.074)** 0.437 (0.038)*** 1.210 (0.150)*** 0.264 (0.050)***
DDA_MODERATE2 −0.267 (0.042)*** −0.171 (0.032)*** −0.167 (0.059)** −0.300 (0.046)*** −1.058 (0.141)*** −0.075 (0.061)
DDA_SEVERE −0.525 (0.039)*** −0.336 (0.044)*** −0.308 (0.103)** −0.588 (0.044)*** −1.376 (0.184)*** −0.324
(0.057)***
RAE_MODERATE 0.169 (0.034)*** 0.108 (0.024)*** 0.111 (0.041)** 0.212 (0.038)*** 0.522 (0.141)*** 0.067 (0.043)
RAE_SEVERE −0.743 (0.039)*** −0.461 (0.056)*** −0.406 (0.138)** −0.869 (0.044)*** −2.342 (0.215)*** −0.204
(0.059)***
COST −0.008 (0.001)*** −0.005 (0.001)*** −0.004 (0.001)** −0.0118 (0.040)*** −0.012 (0.002)*** −0.008
(0.001)***
A −0.054 (0.054) −0.033 (0.034) 0.002 (0.025) −0.073 (0.066) 0.370 (0.274) −0.122 (0.073)!
Entropy θ1̂; θ2
 
― ― (1.026, 0.717) ― ―
α̂0(FEMALE) ― 0.170 (0.035)*** ― ― ―
α̂1(VOCATIONAL) ― −0.230 (0.085)** ― ― ―
α̂2(GCSEs_O + A) ― −0.199 (0.054)*** ― ― ―
π̂c ― ― ― ― 0.49 0.51
γ̂c(VOCATIONAL) ― ― ― ― −0.892 (0.324)
** —
γ̂c(GCSEs_O + A) ― ― ― ― 0.577 (0.203)
** —
γ̂c(FEMALE) — — — — 0.285 (0.122)
* —
γ̂c
(RESPONDENTAGE)
0.024 (0.009)**
Log-likelihood (AIC) −2855.357
(5736.713)
−2812.19
(5670.381)
−2837.971
(5670.381)
−2782.51
(5611.019)
−2652.879
(5379.757)
Notes: SE = standard error. For the HMNL and LCMNL models, we report selected effects of respondent-characteristics on the scale-parameter and latent-class
membership. MMNL model was estimated using 500 Halton draws of correlated normally-distributed coefficients for the variables A, INTRAVENOUS and SUBCUTA-
NEOUS and a log-normal distributed cost coefficient. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05! p < 0.10. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
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Patient benefits and cost savings
Table 5 shows MWTP estimates for each of the non-
cost attributes studied and the associated confidence
intervals around these estimates. A positive dMWTP
indicates a preference for an attribute taking into ac-
count the associated cost, whilst a negative dMWTP
indicates a dispreference. As observed in Table 4,
there are subtle differences in the MWTP estimates
obtained from the different econometric models. We
focus on estimates from the LCMNL model as this
provided the best fit with the choice data collected.
This shows a statistically significant and substantial
willingness-to-pay for drug delivery modes that are
associated with “moderate” disruption to daily activ-
ities and “moderate” risk of adverse events. There is
also a statistically significant and substantial
willingness-to-pay to avoid drug delivery modes that
are associated with “moderate but unmanageable” or
“severe” disruptions to daily activities. Similarly, there
is a statistically significant and substantial willingness-
to-pay to avoid drug delivery modes that are associ-
ated with “severe” risk of adverse events. Further,
there is a statistically significant and substantial
willingness-to-pay to avoid drug administration via
the intramuscular route.
To evaluate the welfare change, i.e., the intangible
benefits from manufacturing drugs in a patient-
friendly manner, we considered the following. A given
biologic drug C can be manufactured in two ways
(C1 and C2). Assume, as we did in the survey, that
both versions of the drug have the same molecule, ef-
ficacy and safety profile. In option C1, the drug can
be manufactured for intravenous administration in
clinical settings, and this mode of drug delivery is as-
sociated with “severe” risk of adverse events and “se-
vere” disruptions to patients’ daily activities. Option
C2 is where a drug is manufactured for subcutaneous
self-administration in non-clinical settings and this
mode of drug delivery is associated with “moderate”
risk of adverse events and “moderate” disruptions to
patients’ daily activities. In this case, we can compute
the expected compensating variation ( dECV ) using eq.
(8). Since household-income categories had no statis-
tically significant effect on class membership in our
preferred LCMNL model, we do not differentiate ourdECV by household-income category.
Based on the MNL model, switching from option C1
to C2 yields a welfare gain (dECV per patient per unit ad-
ministration) of -£296 (95% CI: −£302 to -£289). Based
on the MMNL model, dECV is: −£364 (95% CI: −£370 to
-£358). Based on the LCMNL model with two latent-
classes, and unconditional on latent-class membership,
we obtained dECV of -£435 (95% CI: −£524 to -£346).
Note that the ECV is a measure of welfare gain, not wel-
fare loss. The negative sign reflects the fact that ECV is
the amount of money that has to be taken from the state
of having option C2 so that the average respondent will
be indifferent to option C1 (see equation 8). Note also
that with our choice data failure to control for preference
Table 5 Marginal willingness-to-pay estimates
MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model
Variables: MWTP̂ 95%CIð Þ MWTP̂(95% CI) MWTP̂ 95%CIð Þ MWTP̂ 95%CIð Þ MWTP̂ 95%CIð Þ
INTRAVENOUS −2.12 (−4.09, −0.16)* 1.17 (−0.74, 3.08) 3.43 (1.73, 5.14)* 2.31 (−2.86, 7.49)* 5.85 (−50.38, 62.07)
SUBCUTANEOUS 2.35 (1.37, 3.32)* 2.60 (1.58, 3.63)* 0.23 (−0.52, 1.03) −8.33 (−10.31, −6.34)* 2.42 (−7.76, 12.59)
INTRAMUSCULAR −17.43 (−18.65,
−16.22)*
−19.19 (−20.41,
−17.97)*
−26.08 (−27.15,
−25.01)*
−9.39 (−11, −7.77)* −40.63 (−72.47, −8.80)*
DOSFREQ −0.08 (−0.09, −0.08)* −0.09 (−0.094, −0.085)* −0.12 (−0.13, −0.12)* −0.10 (−0.10, −0.09)* −0.23 (−0.30, −0.17)*
NONCLINICAL_SELF 21.45 (20.51, 22.39)* 22.41 (21.48, 23.35)* 26.35 (25.55, 27.16)* 31.01 (29.87, 32.14)* 28.57 (21.40, 35.74)*
NONCLINICAL_SUPV −15.45 (−16.06,
−14.83)*
−15.74 (−16.36,
−15.11)*
−15.46 (−15.95,
−14.96)*
−19.83 (−20.64, −19.02)* −15.53 (−26.04, −5.03)*
DDA_MODERATE1 50.09 (48.91, 51.27)* 49.40 (48.15, 50.65)* 50.14 (49.02, 51.27)* 58.88 (57.65, 60.11)* 84.71 (67.59, 101.82)*
DDA_MODERATE2 −34 (−35.15, −32.85)* −35.24 (−36.51,
−33.97)*
−38.86 (−39.89,
−37.83)*
−43.13 (−44.35, −41.92)* −58.84 (−72.28, −45.40)*
DDA_SEVERE −66.36 (−67.74,
−64.99)*
−68.64 (−70.14,
−67.14)*
−71.55 (−72.80,
−70.30)*
−73.64 (−75.15, −72.14)* −94.50 (−117.91, −71.10)*
RAE_MODERATE 22.06 (21.20, 22.92)* 22.64 (21.74, 23.53)* 26.37 (25.59, 27.14)* 30.32 (29.23, 31.41)* 23.49 (17.29, 29.70)*
RAE_SEVERE −94.65 (−96.64,
−92.65)*
−94.77 (−96.85,
−92.70)*
−94.75 (−96.58,
−92.93)*
−116.08 (−117.65,
−114.51)*
−130.32 (−165.12,
−95.53)*
Notes: The 95% CIs above are “standard or classical confidence intervals” calculated using 100 bootstrapped replicates of MWTP. This is because accurate, less-
erratic and reliable “bootstrap confidence intervals” require replications in the order of 1000, which would have been computationally demanding and time con-
suming [32]. The confidence intervals reported are therefore not exact. * indicates confidence interval does not include zero
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heterogeneity in the MNL model leads to an underestima-
tion of welfare change. The same argument may not be ap-
plicable to other choice data. But how does our ECV
estimates (of intangible benefits to patients) compare with
savings in drug administration costs to a healthcare payer?
To answer this question, we used a regression-based algo-
rithm to predict the cost of UK NHS resources that will be
consumed in administering drugs C1 and C2. Details of this
algorithm will be found elsewhere [4]. We maintained all
previous assumptions made in computing estimates of ECV,
and added the following. One, both drugs C1 and C2 are in-
dicated for management of a chronic illness; two, product
C2 is sold bundled with some of the equipment and con-
sumables used in drug administration; and three, a single full
treatment course of C1 over a year requires 10 unit adminis-
trations whilst a single full treatment course of C2 requires 5
unit administrations over a year. Direct monetary costs of
administering drugs C1 and C2 were then estimated as:
lnAD dMINCOSTC1 ¼ 7:1499−3:2026 0ð Þ−5:2737 0ð Þ þ :428 10ð Þ
þ:404 0ð Þ−:2896 1ð Þ−:00106 102 −:3173 10ð Þ 1ð Þ
AD dMINCOSTC1 ¼ exp 7:8613ð Þ•Φ^ ¼ 1:0792ð Þ ¼ £2800:41
lnAD dMINCOSTC2 ¼ 7:1499−3:2026 1ð Þ−5:2737 0ð Þ þ :428 5ð Þ
þ:404 1ð Þ−:2896 1ð Þ−:00106 52 −:3173 5ð Þ 1ð Þ
AD dMINCOSTC2 ¼ exp 4:6099ð Þ•Φ^ ¼ 1:3799ð Þ ¼ £138:64
where ɸ^ ¼ 1.0792 and 1.3799 are the subgroup-specific
smearing factors for intravenous and subcutaneous
products respectively.
The estimates above yield a cost saving of roughly
£2662 per patient per year; or £532 per patient per unit
administration of switching from C1 to C2. This is com-
parable to the absolute value of dECV : £435 derived from
the LCMNL model.
Discussion
The non-zero MWTP and ECV estimates reported
above provide a monetary measure of the “clinical us-
ability” of a drug – where clinical usability has to do
with the mode of drug administration as separate from
considerations of efficacy, safety and/or value-for-
money. Some might consider MWTP and ECV as
old-fashioned, redundant metrics of welfare change –
arguing that it is better to evaluate predicted choice
probabilities for a selected group of products (bundles of
attributes). However, such discrete demand analyses will
not allow us to compare the monetary value of the in-
tangible benefits from making patient-friendly medicines
with the monetary savings in drug administration costs.
From our analyses, we found that the monetary value
of the intangible benefits (from satisfied patients’ prefer-
ences) is in the same order of magnitude as savings on
the direct monetary costs of resources healthcare pro-
viders spend on drug administration. Our results also in-
dicate a strong positive preference for modes of drug
administration that are associated with some but not sig-
nificant risks of adverse events and/or disruptions to pa-
tients daily activities. They also show a positive
preference for self-administration of drugs in non-
clinical settings – and a negative preference for drug ad-
ministration in clinical settings or non-clinical settings
under the supervision of a qualified healthcare profes-
sional. Advances in biopharmaceutical manufacturing
such as pre-filled syringes, auto-injectors and pen injec-
tors and other innovations that reduce the risk of ad-
verse events and/or disruptions to daily activities clearly
hit with these observations.
This argument, however, assumes that the state of bio-
pharmaceutical manufacturing and formulation science
is mature enough to support the desired innovations in
making patient-friendly medicines and/or that the profit
signals are strong enough to get manufacturers to con-
sider end-user preferences. There might be, of course,
practical manufacturing challenges that militate against
reverse engineering product option C1 to C2. Neverthe-
less, our estimates indicate there are substantial benefits
from developing patient-friendly drug delivery systems if
the underlying formulation and manufacturing science
makes it possible to do so. If these societal benefits are
considered important by policy makers, then there is a
case for public interventions to encourage manufactur-
ing research in an attempt to achieve the desired goal of
producing clinically usable medicines and drug delivery
devices. With the right pricing and reimbursement en-
vironment, an additional incentive for manufacturers to
consider the preferences of end-users may come from
attempts to differentiate products in order to maintain
or increase market shares.
For any given cohort of patients (end-users), a drug
product that closely matches the preferences of the aver-
age representative end-user or consumer should enjoy
higher demand volumes (keeping prices unchanged).
Product differentiation along the lines of satisfying end-
user preferences for the mode of drug administration
may indeed create brand loyalty without manufacturers
engaging in academic detailing or direct-to-consumer
advertising. We would also expect additional demand
inducement where manufacturing a drug product in a
patient-friendly manner, amplifies the (incremental)
direct health benefits derived from that drug. This is
particularly important considering healthcare payers and
providers’ requirements for estimates of cost-
effectiveness from manufacturers to demonstrate prod-
uct value. Our ECV estimates measure indirect or intan-
gible benefits assuming direct health benefits remain the
same. So if healthcare payers and providers are willing
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to pay for the value of the drug delivery mode, and the
discounted present value of private producer surplus of
developing patient-friendly drug delivery systems (relative
to other investment opportunities) is positive, then manu-
facturers should consider the switch from C1 to C2.
As with all research, a number of limitations apply to
the arguments above.
First, the list of attributes evaluated in this study was
taken from a selective literature review. Ideally, one
would want to supplement this literature review with in-
terviews and/or focus group discussions involving end-
users. Given the time and resources available for this
study, we were not able to apply these qualitative
methods – which are of most value where there is a lack
or dearth of existing (grey) literature. We therefore make
no claim here that the selected set of attributes and
attribute-levels are exhaustive of all characteristics of all
possible modes of drug administration. We believe, how-
ever, that the selected attributes and attribute-levels in
Table 1 are realistic, relevant and suited for investigating
the gross welfare benefits (consumer surplus) from
manufacturing patient-friendly medicines. Second, the
levels “none”, “moderate” and “severe” for the attribute
risk-of-adverse-events, for example, will be understood
differently by different respondents with different back-
grounds. The attribute-levels were chosen to represent a
natural categorical ordering of risk or severity; but the
strength of respondents’ preferences could be influenced
by differences in attribute perception. Unfortunately, we
did not include variables constructed to measure attri-
bute perceptions in our analysis. Differences in attribute
perception will appear as preference heterogeneity in the
MMNL and LCMNL models we estimated. Or, with
preferences restricted to be the same, appear as unob-
served heterogeneity in the HMNL and EMNL models.
We cannot therefore make any statements about the
precise impacts of differences in attribute perception on
choices. What we know is: age, gender and education
affect variation in individual preferences; and the same
set of respondent characteristics plus employment status
influence unobserved heterogeneity.
Third, it might be argued that our ECV estimates
depend on the cost levels chosen. However, Hanley
et al. [29] have shown that using different levels for
the cost attribute may not result in statistically sig-
nificant differences in estimates of welfare change al-
beit there is a possibility that such differences might
be significant when the ECV estimates are employed
in cost-benefit analyses, for example. See also
Slothuus et al. [30]. In our study, we believe that the
chosen cost range with an upper limit of £100 ad-
equately captures out-of-pocket access costs that NHS
patients are most likely to pay. Considering also the
near zero coefficients, we will argue that cost levels
beyond £100, and any non-linearity in the cost-
attribute effects, are unlikely to change the arguments
above. Fourth, some might argue that dECV derived
from the LCMNL model suffers from ecological fal-
lacy – as they are based on the average weighted co-
efficients over two latent-classes. For that matter
(erroneous) conclusions that apply at the aggregate
level may not apply at the latent-class level. However,
we do not know a priori which latent-class a given
respondent belongs to. Since we cannot assume fixed
class membership, the reported dECV , which is uncon-
ditional on class membership, is a valid measure of
welfare change.
Finally, we have only evaluated the preferences of
mostly healthy people from the UK general public at a
given point in time. If preferences change over time, our
estimates may no longer be valid albeit we will not ex-
pect any dramatic differences from what we have re-
ported. A possible avenue for future research is to repeat
the analysis here using a panel data of discrete choices
collected over time. That aside, it is well known that
end-user preferences for healthcare interventions in
healthy states are not the same as when they are in sick
states – and that people make decisions behind a “veil of
experience”, i.e., they prefer products and services that
they have previously experienced [31]. Hence, our sam-
ple which was dominated by healthy people may bias
our estimates. We did indeed recognize the issue and it
is for this reason we linked the variable PRIOR_ILL-
NESS to the scale parameter in the HMNL model – to
partially account for health-state-dependent preferences
and the experience-good features of healthcare. What is
more the variable for prior illness was not a statistically
significant predictor of preference heterogeneity in the
LCMNL model. We did not ask survey respondents the
type of illness (acute or chronic) they had experienced.
The variable for prior illness therefore is crude and it
says nothing about the number of visits to a health facil-
ity in the past year or the severity of illness and whether
this affects respondents’ cognitive abilities. It is then pos-
sible that specific patient-populations (for example,
those suffering from Alzheimer’s, diabetes or some form
of cancer) may have preferences that differ from that of
the sample we studied. We leave this issue of health-
state-dependent preferences for future research.
Conclusions
In this study, we attempted to estimate the monetary
value of end-user preferences for a generic set of attri-
butes of different modes of drug administration. We
found a non-trivial marginal willingness-to-pay for drug
delivery systems associated with zero or moderate risk of
adverse events and/or disruption to patients’ daily
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activities. We also found a high marginal willingness-to-
pay for self-administration of drugs in non-clinical set-
tings. In addition, we estimated that the monetary value
of making patient-friendly medicines could be as large as
the savings on direct monetary costs of drug administra-
tion to healthcare payers and providers. We argue that
as long as there is recognition of the value of the drug
delivery mode (besides the value of drug molecules in
improving health outcomes); and the underlying manu-
facturing science is capable, a patient-centred approach
to producing beneficial drugs and drug delivery systems
should be encouraged and pursued.
Endnotes
1Note that our simulated discrete-choice data were not
derived from known utility functions or a known β vec-
tor. Our interests are in the robustness of the attribute-
coefficients ( β^ ) and not how β^ closely approximates
prior or “true” values of β. The lower standard errors
and high number of statistically significant coefficients,
obtained from the same MNL model estimated with the
same simulated dataset, confirms the efficiency gain
from our chosen experimental design.
2In determining C*, we estimated a number of
LCMNL models with 2–10 latent-classes. To increase
the speed of computation, we estimated these models
without the Z variables in the class-membership func-
tion, i.e., equation (6). We found the closest competitor
to the LCMNL with two-classes (cAIC = 5522.461,
BIC = 5495.461) was an LCMNL with four classes
(cAIC = 5528.196, BIC = 5473.196). We chose the two-
class LCMNL model on the basis of precision loss in the
estimated coefficients: the fourth latent-class of the
LCMNL model with four-classes had no statistically sig-
nificant coefficients.
3Because the measure of entropy is derived from
choice probabilities predicted from the MNL model, it is
in effect an “endogenous” explanatory variable that
might bias the coefficients of the EMNL model. In Table
4, we observe that, even if these coefficients are biased,
they are consistent with that of the MNL and HMNL
models. What is more, the primary purpose of the
EMNL model is to assess respondents’ (fatigued) reac-
tions to the choice tasks, i.e., we are interested mostly in
equation (4) and not equation (3).
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